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Abstract
Currently, only China has a parliament larger than the German Bundestag, which continues
to grow due to the increasing number of overhang mandates. In 2016, Norbert Lammert, then
president of the Bundestag, proposed to restrict it to 630 members by allocating mandates
according to quotas for each of the German states (Länder), which should be proportional to
their population. This idea found no approval among the German parties, neither large nor
small [Finthammer 2018]. Only in October 2019, after predictions that the next Bundestag
could exceed 800 seats, did some 100 German experts in constitutional law write an open
letter suggesting to constrain its size by reducing the number of effective constituencies, and
the Bundestag vice-president, Thomas Oppermann, called for such a reform without delay.
These and other proposals require a profound change in the existing election system.
But a mathematical solution to the problem does not require such changes and is much
simpler. We can prevent unfettered growth of the Bundestag — caused by allotting too
many direct mandates to parties that received too few second votes — by replacing the
principle of ’one man, one vote’ with a new concept: fraction-valued votes for Bundestag
members. Such a practice could make overhang mandates unnecessary and the basic 598
Bundestag seats sufficient under all circumstances. For this purpose, the members of the
overrepresented parties (because they receive too many direct mandates) should have vote
power < 1 and the members of other parties should have vote power > 1. We explain the
vote power adjustments using the example of the 2017 Bundestag.






The German two-vote electoral system embodies two major historical concepts of political
representation coined during the American and French Revolutions. The descriptive concept
(leading to proportional representation) — that is, the parliament portrays the society in
miniature1 — is implemented in the first vote (Erststimme), with which local candidates are
elected within constituencies and delegated to the federal parliament (Bundestag). These
direct mandate holders from 299 German constituencies fill 299 Bundestag seats.
The agent concept (leading to majoritarianism) — that is, the parliament is a committee
of political experts who make majority decisions as the people’s trustees and not simply
as their fellow countrymen2 — is embodied in the second vote (Zweitstimme) for a party.
The second vote serves two purposes: (1) to qualify parties receiving at least 5% of the
second votes nationwide for seats in the Bundestag, and (2) to apportion the number of
seats alloted to each qualifying party in accordance with the second votes, including the
direct mandate holders. For this purpose, another 299 Bundestag seats are allocated. If the
required proportion between party factions is unattainable within the regular 299 + 299 =
598 seats, some extra seats called overhang mandates (Ubërhangmandate) are added.
Currently, only China has a parliament larger than the German Bundestag, which con-
tinues to grow due to the increasing number of overhang mandates: the 2005, 2009, 2013 and
2017 Bundestags had 16, 24, 33 and 111 overhangs, respectively, and the 2017 Bundestag
has as many as 709 members. Such growth makes the Bundestag more expensive for taxpay-
ers: its annual budget is already approaching a billion Euros [Finthammer 2018]. In 2016,
Norbert Lammert, then president of the Bundestag, proposed to restrict it to 630 members
by allocating mandates according to quotas for each of the German states (Länder), which
should be proportional to their population [Roßner 2016]. This idea found no approval
among the German parties, neither large nor small [Finthammer 2018]. Only in October
2019, after predictions that the next Bundestag could exceed 800 seats, did some 100 Ger-
1The descriptive concept was defended in America by John Adams (1735–1826), one of the key
Founding Fathers, the first Vice President and the Second President of the United States from 1797–
1801. In France, the same viewpoint was shared by Honore Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau
(1749–1791), a statesman, a moderate revolutionary and promoter of a British-like constitutional
monarchy [Tangian 2014, pp. 167–168].
2The agent concept was promoted by American Federalists, particularly by Alexander Hamilton
(1755?–1804), one of key Founding Father of the United States and James Madison (1751–1836),
the fourth President of the USA from 1809–1817. In France, the concept of political representative
as professional was developed by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836), clergyman and political
writer [Tangian 2014, pp. 165–166, 168–169].
1
man experts in constitutional law write an open letter suggesting to constrain its size by
reducing the number of effective constituencies, and the Bundestag vice-president, Thomas
Oppermann, called for such a reform without delay [Spiegel online 2019, Zeit online 2019].
These and other proposals require a profound change in the existing election system. But
a mathematical solution to the problem does not require such changes and is much simpler.
We can prevent unfettered growth of the Bundestag — caused by allotting too many direct
mandates to parties that received too few second votes — by replacing the principle of ’one
man, one vote’ with a new concept: fraction-valued votes for Bundestag members. Such
a practice could make overhang mandates unnecessary and the basic 598 Bundestag seats
sufficient under all circumstances. For this purpose, the members of the overrepresented
parties (because they receive too many direct mandates) should have vote power < 1 and
the members of other parties should have vote power > 1.
Deviations from ‘the ideal of one man, one vote’ [Balinski and Young 1982] are in fact
not that uncommon. For instance, the chairman of a committee with an even number of
members may be given one and a half votes to avoid a tie. In joint-stock companies, the vote
power of each shareholder is proportional to his/her percentage of shares, etc. In parliaments
like the Bundestag, the situation is only complicated by a possible mismatch between the
number of the parties’ direct mandates and the faction’s weights derived from the second
votes. We explain the vote power adjustments in such cases using an example.
In Section 2, ‘Fraction-Valued Votes for the 598-seat Bundestag’, the vote power adjust-
ments are explained using the example of the 2017 Bundestag.
In Section 3, ‘Bundestag with Restricted Fraction-Valued Votes and a Few Overhangs’,
the deviation from the principle ‘one voter, one vote’ is made small at the price of adding a
few overhang mandates.
Section 4, ‘Compatibility with the Current Bundestag Allocation Rules’, shows that in
the case of 709 seats, as in the actual 2017 Bundestag, our model computes exactly the same
allocation of Bundestag seats as it has.
In Section 5, ‘Conclusion’, the main findings are recapitulated and put into context.
Section 6, ‘Annex: D’Hondt and Saint-Laguë Methods for Allocating Parliamentary
Seats’, explains two main methods for allocating parliamentary seats.
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2 Fraction-Valued Votes for the 598-seat Bundestag
The 2017 Bundestag election outcomes [Bundestwahlleiter 2017] are displayed in the first
section of Table 1 (Columns 1–3). Column 1 shows the number of direct mandates received
by the seven parties eligible for the Bundestag seats — in total 299 mandates from 299
constituencies. Column 2 contains the percentages of the second votes received by these
parties. Since 5% of second votes were cast for other parties, the grand total of Column 2
is equal to 95%. Column 3 contains the values of the second column normalized — brought
up to 100%, prescribing the weights of the Bundestag factions.
The second section of the table (Columns 4–6) describes the Bundestag with the regular
598 seats. As shown in Columns 4–5, the CDU’s 185 direct mandates occupy 30.9% of the
598 Bundestag seats, exceeding the CDU’s faction weight of 28.2%. To bring the total CDU’s
voting power in line with the CDU’s weight, the CDU faction member’s vote power vCDU
is reduced. Since we consider 598 Bundestag seats, we solve the following equation:
CDU member’s vote power :
185
598
× vCDU × 100% = 28.2% ⇒ vCDU ≈ 0.91 .
This CDU faction members’ vote power is shown at the top of Column 6.
Similarly, the 46 CSU direct mandate holders occupy 7.7% of the Bundestag seats instead
of the prescribed 6.5%. Proceeding in the same way as above, we obtain the CSU faction
member’s vote power vCSU from the following equation:
CSU member’s vote power :
46
598
× vCSU × 100% = 6.5% ⇒ vCSU ≈ 0.84 .
A simple check shows that the direct mandate holders of the other five parties do not fill














= 367 seats .
These 367 seats are allocated to the five parties according to the German election law —
using the Sainte-Laguë method; see Part IV, Section 6.2 — and the results are listed in
Column 4.
Comparing Columns 3 and 5, we see that these five parties have fewer seats than pre-
scribed by their faction weights. Correspondingly, the vote powers v of these faction
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
CDU 185 26.8 28.17 185 30.9 0.91 185 29.4 0.96 185 29.0 0.97 200 28.2 1.00
SPD 59 20.5 21.59 121 20.2 1.07 133 21.1 1.02 135 21.2 1.02 153 21.6 1.00
AfD 3 12.6 13.30 75 12.5 1.06 81 12.9 1.03 83 13.0 1.02 94 13.3 1.00
FDP 0 10.7 11.31 63 10.5 1.07 69 11.0 1.03 71 11.1 1.02 80 11.3 1.00
LINKE 5 9.2 9.72 55 9.2 1.06 59 9.4 1.04 60 9.4 1.03 69 9.7 1.00
GRÜNE 1 8.9 9.41 53 8.9 1.06 57 9.0 1.04 58 9.1 1.04 67 9.4 1.00
CSU 46 6.2 6.49 46 7.7 0.84 46 7.3 0.89 46 7.2 0.90 46 6.5 1.00
Total 299 95.0 100 598 100 598 630 100 630 638 100 638 709 100 709
members are increased to make the total voting power of every faction equal to its weight
in Column 3. For instance, the SPD faction member’s vote power vSPD is found from the
following equation:
SPD member’s vote power :
121
598
× vSPD × 100% = 21.6% ⇒ vSPD ≈ 1.07 .
The bottom row of the table consists of control sums, except for Columns 6, 9, and
12, with the total vote power of the Bundestag. For instance, the total vote power of the
598-seat Bundestag — the scalar product of Columns 4 and 6 — is equal to 598 votes:
185× 0.91︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vote power
of CDU
+ 121× 1.07︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vote power
of SPD
+ · · ·+ 46× 0.84︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vote power
of CSU
= 598 votes .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vote power
of Bundestag
3 Bundestag with Restricted Fraction-Valued Votes and
a Few Overhangs
The third section of Table 1 (Columns 7–9) describes the Bundestag with 630 seats (= with 32
overhangs), as suggested by Norbert Lammert. The CDU and CSU are still overrepresented
because they have too many direct mandates, but not as much as in the case of the Bundestag
with 598 seats. Due to overhang mandates, the degree of parties’ over-/underrepresentation
is smaller than in the Bundestag with 598 seats, requiring smaller deviations from 1 in the
faction members’ vote power. Now, the CDU and CSU faction members’ vote powers are
equal to 0.96 and 0.89 instead of 0.91 and 0.84, respectively. The vote powers of the other
Bundestag members are of the range 1.02–1.04 instead of 1.06–1.07.
4
Relaxations of the principle ‘one man, one vote’ can be moderated by overhang mandates.
If the maximal relaxation is, say, ‘one man, one vote±10%’, i.e. the vote powers are restricted
to 0.9 ≤ v ≤ 1.1, then the Bundestag must have at least 638 seats (40 overhangs), see
Columns 10–12.
4 Compatibility with the Current Bundestag Alloca-
tion Rules
The last section of Table 1 shows our computations for the Bundestag with 709 seats (111
overhangs). All vote powers are equal to 1.00, and the allocation of seats to the eligible parties
is 1–1 as in the actual 2017 Bundestag with its 709 seats;3 see [Bundestwahlleiter 2017].
Therefore, our model is compatible with the German election rules.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, we make a note on our terminology. The ‘faction sizes’ characterize the fac-
tion’s physical volume, which is measured, for instance, in the percentage of parliamentary
seats. The ‘faction weights’, which are proportional to the electoral votes received by the
parliamentary parties, are not physical but electoral characteristics which prescribe the fac-
tions’ total legislative ‘vote power’. As long as the Bundestag seats are allocated with added
overhang mandates — to respect the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ — the factions’ phys-
ical size and the equal legislative vote power will be close to its electoral weight, although
slightly different. These interrelations can be schematized by the following ‘equation’:
Factions in a parliament with numerous overhang mandates:
Electoral weight ≈ Legislative weight = Physical size .
In our consideration, the faction’s legislative vote power is made precisely equal to its
electoral weight, and both can differ from the faction’s physical size. The vote power of indi-
vidual faction members is adjusted correspondingly — at the price of relaxing the principle
of ‘one man, one vote’. These interrelations can be summarized as follows:
Factions in a parliament with a few overhang mandates:
Electoral weight = Legislative weight ≈ Physical size ,
3The actual fractional vote powers in Column 15 are not seen within two decimals.
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Factions in a parliament with no overhang mandates:
Electoral weight = Legislative weight ̸= Physical size .
Thus, the German election rules remain intact, only the counting of parliamentary votes
is modified. The overhang mandates, which regulate the relative influence of parliament
factions, are no longer necessary, being replaced by adjustments to the vote power of faction
members. Moreover, the overhang mandates alone, even as numerous as in the 2017 Bun-
destag, cannot make the faction ratio absolutely precise. Conversely, the use of fractional
vote powers always guarantees the true proportions between faction weights.
6 Annex: D’Hondt and Saint-Laguë Methods for Al-
locating Parliamentary Seats
6.1 D’Hondt Method
In 1882, Belgian lawyer and mathematician Victor d’Hondt (1841–1902) published his method
[D’Hondt 1882] for allocating parliamentary seats to parties in proportion to the votes they
received at elections. The eponymous method is used in many countries and, in partic-
ular, was applied in the German Bundestag until 1985 [D’Hondt-Verfahren 2019]. The
D’Hondt method has numerous mathematical advantages but is also known for slightly favor-
ing large parties over small ones [Balinski and Young 1979, Lijphart 2003, Pukelsheim 2007,
D’Hondt-Verfahren 2019].
The idea of the method is as follows. The party with the most electoral votes ‘purchases’
its first parliamentary seat by ‘spending’ a half of the total votes it received in the election.
At each successive step, the currently ‘richest’ party acquires a seat. For its first seat, the
party ‘pays’ an amount that leaves it with only 1/2 of its original number of votes; then for
its next seat it pays an amount that leaves it with only 1/3 of its original number of votes,
then 1/4, and so on. At every round, however, the next seat goes up to the ‘highest bidder’
— the party with the most votes to spend — until the seats are exhausted. In this way,
the biggest winners can acquire several seats before a minor party ever gets to make its first
‘purchase’.
















⇒ si = si + 1 , (1)
where
i = 1, . . . , n are labels of n parties eligible for parliamentary seats,
si is the number of seats that have already been allocated to the i party (initially si = 0),
S is the total number of parliamentary seats to be allocated, and
Vi is the total number of electoral votes that party i received at the election.
6.2 Webster/Sainte-Laguë Method
The Webster/Sainte-Laguë method strives to complete the same task as the D’Hondt method
and is very similar to it. It is named after the American statesman Daniel Webster (1782–
1852), who proposed it in 1832 for proportional allocation of seats in the United States con-
gressional apportionment [Balinski and Young 1982], and the French mathematician André
Sainte-Laguë (1882–1950), who independently rediscovered it and studied its properties
[Sainte-Laguë 1910]. Together with the D’Hondt method, it is widely used worldwide, some-
times interchangeably.
In 1980, the German physicist and electoral expert Hans Schepers (1928), having studied
the D’Hondt method used by the German Bundestag, discovered that it disadvantaged
smaller parties and suggested an improved version equivalent to the Sainte-Laguë method
[Pukelsheim 2002]. At first it was adopted only for certain Bundestag commissions, but since
2009 it has been used to allocate seats both in the German Bundestag and the European
Parliament [Sainte-Laguë-Verfahren 2019].
The idea of the method is the same as that of d’Hondt, but the progression of ‘payments’
for the seats is different. The party with most electoral votes ‘purchases’ its first parlia-
mentary seat by ‘spending’ 2/3 of its votes. At each successive step, the seat goes to the
currently ‘richest’ party, who ‘pays’ at first an amount that leaves it with only 1/3 of its
original votes, then an amount that leaves it with only 1/5 of its original votes, then 1/7,
etc. The procedure continues as long as there are still seats to be apportioned. As one can
7
see, the biggest winners ‘spend’ their votes much faster than under the D’Hondt method,
thereby giving way to smaller parties.
Correspondingly, the allocation algorithm is slightly modified. In its loop (1), the divisor














⇒ si = si + 1 .
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